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On 14 December 2010, the Bank of England and the Centre for
Economic Policy Research hosted the fifth Monetary Policy
Roundtable.  These events are intended to provide a forum for
economists to discuss key issues affecting the design and
operation of monetary policy in the United Kingdom.(1) As
always, participants included a range of economists from
private sector financial institutions, academia and public
sector bodies.  At this fifth Roundtable there were two
discussion topics:
￿  how different will this recovery be?;  and
￿  how fast can the economy grow without hitting capacity
constraints?
This note summarises the main points made by participants.(2)
Since the Roundtable was conducted under the ‘Chatham
House Rule’, none of the opinions expressed at the meeting
are attributed to individuals.  The views expressed in this
summary do not represent the views of the Bank of England,
the Monetary Policy Committee or the Centre for Economic
Policy Research.
How different will this recovery be?
History suggests that recoveries from recessions involving
banking crises are often more drawn out than standard
recoveries, although there is great heterogeneity between
cases (see, for example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)).(3) This
session discussed the nature of the current UK recovery,
highlighting differences with previous UK and international
episodes, and sought to draw lessons for policymakers.
One participant outlined reasons to be optimistic about the
current recovery.  Signs were so far promising.  The UK and
global recoveries had been stronger than expected to date.  For
example, forecasts for UK and global growth in 2010 had been
revised up significantly over the past 18 months.  And output
growth in the OECD countries during this recovery had
recovered to its pre-crisis trend in less than half the time
taken during the ‘Big Five’ financial crises (Spain (1977),
Norway (1987), Japan (1990), Sweden (1990) and
Finland (1990)).
The speaker noted that a key factor behind the relative
strength of the current recovery was the swiftness of the
monetary policy response.  Global real interest rates had
turned negative quickly this time around, in contrast to the
Great Depression and the ‘Big Five’ crises, which had seen real
interest rates rise during the early months of the crises and
remain elevated for some time.  Furthermore, the introduction
of quantitative easing in the United Kingdom, United States
and euro area had taken place much earlier than in Japan
during the 1990s recession.
The speaker pointed out that fluctuations in private
investment had driven much of the global cycle to date.  Its
recovery could continue to provide a fillip to the growth of
activity, particularly in the United Kingdom where its level
remained low relative to pre-crisis trends.  A downside risk
stemmed from banks’ ongoing efforts to reduce the size of
their balance sheets, which could make it harder for businesses
to obtain credit.  However, the corporate sector financial
surplus remained high in the United Kingdom, which would
allow businesses to tap into their own funds to invest.  And the
high rate of return on capital should encourage firms to
continue to invest. 
Other participants were less optimistic about the prospects for
the recovery.  One speaker identified three impediments to the
recovery, which he characterised as key differences from the
United Kingdom’s recovery in the 1980s.
First, income growth had been weak, reflecting the
composition of the recovery in employment.  Employment had
recovered particularly quickly during this recovery, perhaps
reflecting earlier, unobserved strength of the economy (for
example, if the labour market had entered the recession
tighter than previously assumed).  But that recovery had been
predicated on a rise in part-time jobs and self-employment,
which had depressed hourly pay growth.  Subdued income
growth did not augur well for the recovery of consumer
spending and the wider economy. 
Second, the resilience of inflation had constrained real
take-home pay, weighing on consumption and restricting
household debt repayments.  Some of the causes behind the
rise in inflation may have been structural rather than cyclical,
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for example reflecting increasing energy demand from the
rapidly growing emerging market economies (EMEs).  
Compounding this, the United Kingdom was poorly placed to
benefit from strong EME growth via greater trade, as the share
of EMEs in UK exports remained low.  One participant argued,
however, that strong EME energy demand might just result in a
step change in the level of commodity prices.  If so, the impact
on the rate of inflation would dissipate after a couple of years.
Another participant noted that, in any case, the high volatility
of commodity prices in recent years had been an additional
challenge for policymakers.
Finally, there were significant downside risks from the fiscal
consolidation.  The UK consolidation plans called for an
unusually strong private sector response to maintain
momentum in the recovery.  But evidence from past recoveries
offered no clear steer about the reaction of private
consumption to government spending cuts.  And countries
which in the past had experienced fiscal consolidations had
benefited from strong export markets, falls in bond yields and
transfer payments from the European Union — circumstances
that might not prevail this time around.
One participant noted that assessing how this recovery might
progress depended crucially on the permanence of the output
losses incurred during the recession.  If output had been
permanently reduced, then the recovery might well be in its
final stages.
Most participants agreed that a big downside risk to the
recovery stemmed from problems in the euro area,
particularly in the peripheral countries.  Any deterioration of
the growth outlook would be particularly bad news for the
United Kingdom, given the high share of the euro area in UK
exports. 
Finally, one speaker explored the lessons that could be learned
from the experiences of the United Kingdom and United States
during the Great Depression.  Four lessons were drawn. 
First, fiscal consolidation can expose the economy to the risk
of a double-dip recession if monetary policy is not supportive.
For example, US policymakers’ decision in 1936/37 to double
banks’ reserve requirements while balancing the budget had
tipped the United States into recession in 1938, following a
strong, monetary policy induced recovery in 1933–37.
Second, real interest rates really matter to recoveries.  The
recoveries in the United States and United Kingdom in 1933
had been underpinned by a sharp fall in real interest rates, 
into negative territory.  In the United States, this had reflected
a sizable pickup in inflation expectations, coupled with
near-zero nominal interest rates following the exit from the
gold standard.  
Third, banking crises can lead to permanently lower levels of
output.  The impact primarily comes through reduced
investment and a slower accumulation of the capital stock, as
seen in the United States during the 1930s.
Finally, the mix of fiscal consolidation can affect productivity.
Consolidation through the reduction of ‘non-productive’
government expenditure and higher indirect taxes is less
detrimental to growth than raising direct taxes (as was the
case in the United Kingdom in 1933–37) and cutting back on
‘productive’ expenditure.
How fast can the economy grow without
hitting capacity constraints?
As the economy recovers from the recent deep recession,
participants agreed that an important influence on the
recovery, and on inflationary pressure, would be the speed at
which the economy could grow without hitting capacity
constraints.  That would be determined by both the current
degree of spare capacity in the economy and by the future
growth rate of potential output.
Participants discussed how different indicators offered
contrasting views of the margin of spare capacity currently
within companies.  Survey evidence suggested that the degree
of spare capacity had narrowed and that only a limited
amount remained.  But the depressed level of productivity
relative to its pre-recession trend pointed to a larger degree of
spare capacity.
Surveys of labour market slack had begun to narrow over the
past year, but by less than the surveys of spare capacity within
companies.  When the two sets of surveys were combined, one
participant suggested that a composite measure of slack
implied that the level of output might be about 2% below its
potential, only around half what it was at the height of the
recession.
Some participants thought that while surveys of capacity
utilisation were useful to assess whether or not there was
spare capacity within companies, they were less useful for
assessing the extent of that spare capacity.  And there was
some uncertainty about exactly how companies defined the
concept of ‘normal’ levels of capacity when responding to
these surveys, and whether they took into account capacity
that was temporarily unavailable.  But others argued that the
surveys were a good guide and that these data were broadly
consistent with recent developments in inflation.
The difficulties of using the gap between productivity and its
pre-crisis trend as a measure of spare capacity were also
discussed.  The trend may be sensitive to the period over which
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included the late 1990s, a period of unusually strong
productivity growth.  And the trend may have been affected by
the recession.  Participants also noted difficulties in measuring
productivity, particularly in the service sector.  It was unclear in
which direction measurement issues might affect output, and
it was possible that hours worked were currently overstated,
implying stronger hourly productivity than presently
measured.  However, it was unlikely that these factors were
large enough to account for all of the additional spare capacity
currently implied by the weak productivity data.
If surveys were accurate, and there was limited spare capacity
in the economy, then the depressed level of output relative to
its pre-recession trend implied that potential output had fallen
by around 7% or 8%.  Most participants agreed that it was
hard to explain the channels through which a fall of this
magnitude may have occurred.  But some argued that the lack
of a clear explanation for such a large fall in supply did not
necessarily mean that it had not happened.
Some participants thought that one reason why the surveys
indicated limited spare capacity was that supply was
endogenous, and that as demand picked up supply would
return.  It was noted that there were examples, such as the
United States in the 1930s and Sweden in the 1990s, where
output had fallen sharply but had eventually returned to its
previous trend, suggesting that a loss of actual output does not
necessarily imply a loss of potential output.
Some participants thought that the main impact of the
financial crisis was likely to be on the level of output rather
than its growth rate in the future.  Relatively high use of
information and communications technologies was one reason
why UK productivity growth had been strong relative to other
countries prior to the financial crisis.  And these technologies
were likely to continue to have an important and positive
effect on future UK growth.  But other participants thought
that increases in uncertainty and the cost of capital could
reduce future growth.  There was some discussion of how cuts
in the public sector could affect potential growth.  On the one
hand, they might release more skilled labour into the private
sector.  But on the other, reduced spending on infrastructure
and research and development could reduce growth in the
private sector.
Labour supply is also an important component of potential
output growth.  It was noted that migration had made a
substantial contribution to labour supply growth over the
recent past, but recent changes in government policy
suggested that migration from outside the European Union
might slow.  And increases in retirement ages could act in the
opposite direction by raising labour force participation rates.